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OLD REASONS, NEW REASONS, NO REASONS 
Pamela S. Karlan∗ 
 
It has long been the law in cases where rationality review applies 
that “[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of 
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”1 Nowhere have the 
courts been more imaginative than in conceiving justifications for 
laws that deal with the family, gender roles, and sexuality. What was 
true for Shakespeare’s weaver Nick Bottom in the woods outside 
Athens remains true: “[R]eason and love keep little company together 
nowadays.”2 
In this essay, I explore two aspects of judicial review as it relates to 
the family, gender roles, and sexuality. The first is descriptive, albeit 
implicitly critical. In a number of areas, describing what happens as 
“rationality review”—let alone as “heightened scrutiny”—is a bit of a 
misnomer: courts seem to be driven as much by unexamined 
intuitions and deeply felt sentiment as by anything rational. The 
second is speculative. I ask whether the general principle that it is 
“entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived 
reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the 
legislature”3 should still hold when the government affirmatively 
disclaims a particular reason. I suggest that the general principle 
underlying rationality review—deference to the policy choices of the 
political process—cuts against courts upholding a practice on the 
basis of a justification the government forswears. 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law School. I 
delivered an earlier version of this essay as the 2011 Miller Lecture at Georgia State University, as the 
2010 Hon. Betty Roberts Talk at Lewis and Clark Law School, and at a lunchtime workshop at the 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law. In thinking about the issues I discuss here, I also benefitted 
greatly from discussions with Viola Canales, Jane Schacter, and my Constitutional Law class. 
 1. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). 
 2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER’S NIGHT DREAM, Act III, sc. i. 
 3. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). 
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I.  THE CONSTITUTION OF PARENTHOOD 
Family arrangements are fundamental to people’s lives. So it is no 
surprise that the legal rules that affect them prompt a range of 
litigation. As a matter of formal doctrine, courts adjudicate these 
claims under a wide variety of legal standards. Some claims receive 
heightened scrutiny, either because a fundamental right is at issue4 or 
because a disfavored classification is used.5 But even when doctrine 
calls for heightened scrutiny, the analysis judges offer often rests on 
the kind of hypothetical reasoning that rationality review expressly 
contemplates. 
To get a sense of just how forgiving rationality review can be, it is 
hard to imagine a better example than Kotch v. Board of River Port 
Pilot Commissioners.6 For many years, Louisiana had a system for 
licensing river pilots for the port of New Orleans that required 
applicants first to serve a six-month apprenticeship under one of the 
incumbent pilots. The pilots generally chose only their “kinsmen” for 
these career-enabling apprenticeships.7 The plaintiffs in Kotch 
brought suit, alleging that the result of Louisiana’s law was to deny 
them an opportunity to become pilots, in violation of the equal 
protection clause. 
By a 5–4 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana system. 
Justice Hugo Black’s opinion for the Court offered a romanticized 
account of life on the Mississippi. Pilotage, he explained, was “a 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (applying heightened scrutiny to a 
Washington state law that gave visitation rights over a parent’s objection); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 
374, 383–88 (1978) (using heightened scrutiny to strike down a Wisconsin provision denying persons 
who were not meeting their child support obligations the right to marry); Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (using heightened scrutiny to strike down a zoning law as applied to the 
ability of relatives to live together). 
 5. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (overturning a child custody decision that 
denied the mother custody because she was involved in an interracial relationship as impermissible 
racial discrimination); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (striking down a federal survivors’ 
benefits rule that treated widows and widowers differently as impermissible sex discrimination). 
 6. 330 U.S. 552 (1947). Interestingly, the last time the Supreme Court cited the decision was in 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1995), where the Court recognized that the law “seem[ed] unwise or 
work[ed] to the disadvantage of a particular group” and “the rationale for it seem[ed] tenuous.” Id. at 
632 (citing Kotch). Notably, in Kotch itself, the Court took a far rosier view of the challenged law, 
expressing no reservation about the wisdom of the state’s choice. 
 7. See Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 209 La. 737, 746 (1946). 
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highly personalized calling,” requiring “a detailed and extremely 
intimate, almost intuitive, knowledge of the weather, waterways and 
conformation of the harbor or river.”8 Growing up in the distinctive 
“pilot towns” on the river, young men, he declared, “have an 
opportunity to acquire special knowledge of the weather and water 
hazards of the locality and seem to grow up with ambitions to 
become pilots in the traditions of their fathers, relatives, and 
neighbors.”9 
The Court recognized that it was faced with straightforward 
nepotism, but it upheld the law on the hypothesis that Louisiana 
might have concluded that nepotism served the public interest: 
We can only assume that the Louisiana legislature weighed the 
obvious possibility of evil against whatever useful function a 
closely knit pilotage system may serve. Thus the advantages of 
early experience under friendly supervision in the locality of the 
pilot’s training, the benefits to morale and esprit de corps which 
family and neighborly tradition might contribute, the close 
association in which pilots must work and live in their pilot 
communities and on the water, and the discipline and regulation 
which is imposed to assure the State competent pilot service after 
appointment, might have prompted the legislature to permit 
Louisiana pilot officers to select those with whom they would 
serve.10 
Well, maybe. But this sort of nepotism was hardly restricted to 
exceptional vocations like river pilot. In fact, labor unions often 
adopted similar policies in fields that involved no specialized lore or 
public purpose.11 And they did so for the obvious restraint-of-trade 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Kotch, 330 U.S. at 558. 
 9. Id. at 559. 
 10. Id. at 563. 
 11. For example, Local 53, International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos 
Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1969), involved a Title VII lawsuit against a 
Louisiana-based union local that restricted membership to applicants who had “four years of experience 
as an ‘improver’ or ‘helper’ member of the union, but improver membership in the union is restricted to 
sons or close relatives living in the households of members.” 
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advantage exclusion confers. Indeed, even the Supreme Court 
ultimately came to describe Louisiana’s river pilot policy as 
“unwise,” and its “rationale” as “tenuous.”12 
If Kotch represents a romanticization of fathers and sons, then a 
later case, Nguyen v. INS13 represents a staggering blindness. Tuan 
Nguyen was born in 1969 in Vietnam. His mother was a Vietnamese 
national, Hung Thi Nguyen, and his father was an American citizen, 
Joseph Boulais. Tuan’s parents were not married. Shortly after Tuan 
was born, the couple split up and while Tuan was still an infant, he 
went to live with Boulais. After the fall of Saigon to North 
Vietnamese troops, the child came to the United States where he 
lived with his father; he never again had any contact with his 
mother.14 
When Tuan Nguyen was 22 years old, he pleaded guilty to two 
serious felonies in state court. As a result, the INS moved to deport 
him. Nguyen sought to claim U.S. citizenship—which would have 
forestalled the deportation—but the Board of Immigration Appeals 
denied his claim because Boulais had failed to comply with one of 
the requirements for conferring citizenship on a child born abroad to 
a U.S. citizen when the citizen parent is the father, rather than the 
mother, and the parents are not married.15 U.S. law requires 
unmarried fathers to acknowledge a child’s paternity before he turns 
eighteen.16 It imposes no equivalent requirement on U.S. citizen 
mothers. 
                                                                                                                 
  And in the context of public employment, Congress recognized that nepotism was both 
discriminatory and unrelated to job performance. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that when Congress extended federal antidiscrimination laws to public 
employers, it relied on a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights report that had found “discrimination in 
municipal employment even more pervasive than in the private sector . . . because public employers 
often rel[ied] on criteria unrelated to job performance including nepotism or political patronage”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1995) (citing Kotch). 
 13. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 14. See id. at 57; Brief of Petitioners at 5, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).  
 15. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57–58. 
 16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (providing that a person born outside the United States “out of 
wedlock” to a father with United States citizenship can becomes a United States citizen if “while the 
person is under the age of 18 years . . . the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence 
or domicile, . . . the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or . . . the 
paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court”). 
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Again by a 5–4 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the statute against 
an equal protection challenge. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court offered two rationales for treating unmarried fathers and 
unmarried mothers differently. The first is that the government has an 
important interest in “assuring that a biological parent-child 
relationship exists”17—an interest that the Court saw as automatically 
“verifiable from the birth itself”18 in the case of mothers, but 
requiring proof in the cases of fathers, who “need not be present at 
the birth” and whose presence is not “incontrovertible proof of 
fatherhood” in any case.19 The more interesting and revealing 
rationale was the second: the government’s interest in “ensur[ing] 
that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated 
opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is 
recognized, as a formal matter, by the law, but one that consists of the 
real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and 
citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”20 
Mothers, the Court declared, always have such an opportunity, 
merely from their physical presence at a child’s birth. The Court 
offered no comment on the sexual behavior of American women who 
find themselves unmarried, pregnant, and overseas. By contrast, the 
Court’s portrait of American men was hardly flattering. It suggested 
they would often be unaware that they had impregnated foreign 
women, singling out “young men . . . who are on duty with the 
Armed Forces in foreign countries.”21 It pointed to the “realistic 
possibility” that the father, having enjoyed only a “short sojour[n] 
abroad,”22 would never meet his child. The Court upheld Congress’s 
                                                                                                                 
  By contrast a child born abroad to unmarried parents whose mother is a citizen of the United 
States “shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the 
nationality of the United States at the time of such person's birth, and if the mother had previously been 
physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one 
year.” Id. § 1409(c). 
 17. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 64–65. 
 21. Id. at 65. 
 22. Id. at 66. 
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prerogative to ensure that citizenship is not conferred by “unwitting 
means.”23 
For present purposes, there are two particularly striking aspects of 
the Court’s opinion. The first is the staggering disconnect between 
the Court’s theoretical account of mothers and fathers and the facts in 
the case before it. The only parent who had real everyday ties with 
Nguyen was his father. Whatever the relative magnitude of his 
parents’ ex ante opportunities to develop a relationship with him, 
only his father had realized them. In light of these facts, the Court’s 
insistence that its analysis involved no “stereotype, defined as a 
frame of mind resulting from irrational or uncritical analysis,”24 rings 
hollow at best. 
The second point is the way in which the Court ignored doctrinal 
constraints on the sorts of reasons that can justify discrimination. As 
Justice O’Connor’s impassioned dissent points out, the normal rule in 
cases involving explicit gender classifications is that the justification 
“must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response 
to litigation.”25 Here, however, while the Court set aside the 
Government’s arguments in its brief as “not conclusive as to the 
objects of the statute,”26 instead of inquiring into the actual reasons 
for the differential treatment the Court declared that it would 
“ascertain the purpose of [the] statute by drawing logical conclusions 
from its text, structure, and operation.”27 Notably, the Court nowhere 
in its opinion pointed to any evidence in the legislative record that the 
Congress that enacted the citizenship provisions was concerned with 
ensuring a meaningful day-to-day Kramer v. Kramer style 
relationship between children and their dads. To the contrary, the 
dissent quite persuasively showed that the sex-based distinction was 
enshrined in American law as part of “a historic regime that left 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 67. 
 24. Id. at 68. 
 25. Id. at 76 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 
(1996)). 
 26. Id. at 67 (opinion of the Court). 
 27. Id. at 68. 
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women with responsibility, and freed men from responsibility, for 
nonmarital children.”28 
Even in situations where doctrine clearly calls for heightened 
scrutiny, it is striking how often what the Court elsewhere dismissed 
as “gauzy sociological considerations”29 inflect judicial decisions in 
cases involving gender roles and sexuality. The courts seem endlessly 
inventive in devising new rationales for traditional laws. Recent cases 
involving abortion and marriage equality each reflect a 
jurisprudential jujitsu, in which critiques of traditionalism are turned 
on their head in order to justify existing restrictions. 
For many years, restrictions on abortion were understood as 
limitations on pregnant women’s autonomy, justifiable only if the 
state had some sufficient countervailing interest—for example, 
protection of the fetus. Recently, however, rhetorical focus has 
shifted to what Professor Reva Siegel has called “woman-protective” 
rationales for upholding restrictions on abortion.30 These 
justifications claim to be vindicating, rather than overriding, women’s 
interests. According to their proponents, the government enjoys 
authority to restrict women’s access to abortion because such 
restrictions promote women’s welfare, in the same way that 
minimum wage and maximum hour laws, though they restrict 
workers’ freedom of contract, might be properly understood to 
protect employees’ welfare. 
The locus classicus of women-protective rationalization is the 
Supreme Court’s 2007 opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart,31 the case 
upholding the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act.32 A pivotal 
passage in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court declares the 
“reality” that “[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate expression in 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 29. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). 
 30. See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Women-Protective 
Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991. 
 31. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 32. The following discussion of Carhart is based in large part on my earlier article, The Law of 
Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes From 
the First Full Term of the Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1369 (2008). 
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the bond of love the mother has for her child.”33 Although he 
conceded that there were “no reliable data to measure the 
phenomenon,” Justice Kennedy found it “unexceptionable” and “self-
evident” that women would regret having abortions using the 
proscribed procedure.34 
To be sure, at one level, Justice Kennedy is correct. Some women 
surely do regret having abortions. But how many? The sole source 
Justice Kennedy cited for the idea that the government has a rational 
basis for forbidding women to obtain the proscribed procedure was 
an amicus brief filed on behalf of 180 women who regretted having 
had abortions during the period following Roe v. Wade.35 But there 
have been close to fifty million legal abortions in the United States 
during that time;36 the likelihood that this self-selected sample is 
representative of the population seems infinitesimal. Moreover, that 
some women regret having had abortions tells us very little about 
how to compare that group to two other salient groups: women who 
do not regret having had abortions or women who regret not having 
had them.37 And more fundamentally, the fact that individuals regret 
a choice they have made hardly says that they wish the government 
had forbidden them from having had a choice in the first place. To 
put this in perspective, consider the fact that roughly forty percent of 
marriages entered into in the past half century seem likely to end in 
divorce.38 Some substantial number of those who get divorced 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 159 (citing Brief for Sandra Cano et al. at 22–24, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 
(2007)). 
 36. Guttmacher Inst., Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States (May 2010) (reporting that 
“From 1973 through 2005, more than 45 million legal abortions occurred” and noting that in recent 
years, there were more than one million abortions annually), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html (last visited July 15, 2010). 
 37. To my knowledge, the “turnaway study” being done by scholars at the University of California 
San Francisco, see http://www.ansirh.org/research/turnaway.php (last visited July 15, 2010), is the first 
rigorous study to compare women who had abortions to women who sought abortions but could not 
obtain them, rather than to women who voluntarily carried their pregnancies to term. 
 38. According to the Census Bureau “[a]bout 38 percent of men born from 1945 to 1954 and 41 
percent of women in the same age group had been divorced by 2004.” Most People Make Only One Trip 
Down the Aisle, But First Marriages Shorter, Census Bureau Reports (Sept. 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/marital_status_living_arrangements/cb07-131.html 
(last visited July 15, 2010). 
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presumably regret ever having married their spouse in the first place. 
And yet we see no serious argument that the government should bar 
people from entering into marriages because some proportion of them 
will later feel that they have ruined their lives. In a variety of 
constitutional contexts, the Court has “recognized that a necessary 
corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct 
their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will 
make different choices,”39 and that some of those choices will turn 
out to be regrettable after the fact.40 
Far from being “self-evident,” the Court’s analysis is of course 
profoundly dependent on a particular, and hotly contested, 
worldview. As with the moment of birth in Nguyen, and life on the 
river in Kotch, the moment of abortion in Carhart takes on a mystical 
significance. But ironically, in Carhart, the Court credits an illusory, 
and in fact unwanted parental relationship, while in Nguyen it ignored 
an undeniable parental bond in favor of theory. 
The inventive rationalization that characterized Carhart is also 
evident in the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Hernandez v. 
Robles41 to uphold the state’s restriction of marriage to opposite-sex 
couples. I think it is safe to say that the conventional rationale for 
restricting marriage to heterosexual couples rested, in significant part, 
on a disapproval of homosexual relationships.42 But that rationale is 
no longer acceptable, at least not in blue states. So the New York 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205-05 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 40. Vera Pavlova’s poem, If There Is Something To Desire, captures this point exactly: 
If there is something to desire, 
there will be something to regret. 
If there is something to regret, 
there will be something to recall. 
 
If there is something to recall, 
there was nothing to regret. 
If there was nothing to regret, 
there was nothing to desire. 
Vera Pavlova, Four Poems, THE NEW YORKER, July 30, 2007, available at 
http://verapavlova.us/New_Yorker.html (last visited July 15, 2010). 
 41. 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). 
 42. In enacting a federal definition of “marriage” that restricts the institution to opposite-sex couples, 
1 U.S.C. § 7, for example, Congress invoked “defending traditional notions of morality” as one of the 
four “governmental interests” supporting its action. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 12, reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2916–17. 
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court devised a new rationale that comes quite close to turning the 
conventional justification on its head. One of the two grounds it 
identified that “rationally support[ed] the limitation on marriage”43 to 
opposite-sex couples stemmed from the importance of avoiding 
“instability” in heterosexual relationships. The legislature, it declared, 
could find that sexual relationships between men and women “are all 
too often casual or temporary.”44 Marriage, “and its attendant 
benefits,” might provide an “inducement” to opposite-sex couples to 
stay together for the benefit of the children that were the unintended 
consequence of their sexual relationships.45 
By contrast, same-sex couples would not create children 
carelessly: 
These couples can become parents by adoption, or by artificial 
insemination or other technological marvels, but they do not 
become parents as a result of accident or impulse. The 
Legislature could find that unstable relationships between people 
of the opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be 
born into or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with 
same-sex couples, and thus that promoting stability in opposite-
sex relationships will help children more. This is one reason why 
the Legislature could rationally offer the benefits of marriage to 
opposite-sex couples only.46 
Notice how the New York court in its haste to restrict marriage has 
unwittingly denigrated heterosexuals as irresponsible and impulsive 
and suggested that straight men often avoid attachment to their 
children absent external compulsion. This is Nguyen with a 
vengeance. And the New York court apparently thought that men 
unwittingly impregnate women in casual encounters at home as well 
as abroad. Moreover, by contrasting the feckless, reckless, accident-
prone straight fornicator with the gay or lesbian couple that 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
10
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painstakingly achieves parenthood through deliberative means, the 
New York court assured that its justification involves judicial 
invention rather than discernment of actual purpose: It defies belief to 
assume that New York’s longstanding marriage restriction in fact 
excluded gay people because they could be trusted to take care of 
their children. There is an oft-quoted assertion by Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes that “[it] is revolting to have no better reason for a 
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is 
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation 
of the past.”47 But the four parenthood-related cases I have 
discussed—Kotch, Nguyen, Carhart, and Hernandez—suggest that 
there may be an equivalent problem when courts offer newfangled 
justifications for old rules that have outworn their original purposes. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF REPUDIATED REASONS 
That is not what I meant at all. 
        That is not it, at all. 
T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock 
The hypothetical reasons advanced in favor of upholding a 
challenged statute might often be viewed as a sort of best-lights 
reading of the statute: what rationales might justify the legislative 
choice?48 But saying that rationality review authorizes a court to 
imagine additional justifications for a law does not answer a question 
that is arising with special urgency in the context of marriage equality 
litigation: can a court rely on reasons that the government 
affirmatively repudiates? To my mind, even if courts can fill a 
justificatory vacuum by hypothesizing a permissible reason for a 
challenged statute, they should not uphold laws on the basis of 
reasons that the democratic process has already rejected. 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 48. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 128 (1986). 
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In Gill v. Office of Personnel Management49—which challenges 
the constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act insofar as 
it results in a denial of federal benefits to same-sex couples who are 
validly married under state law (there, the law of Massachusetts)—
the court noted that Congress had expressly identified “four interests” 
which Congress had “sought to advance through the enactment of 
DOMA: (1) encouraging responsible procreation and child-bearing, 
(2) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional heterosexual 
marriage, (3) defending traditional notions of morality, and (4) 
preserving scarce resources.”50 In the course of the litigation, 
however, the federal government’s attorneys “disavowed Congress’s 
stated justifications for the statute,”51 defending it instead on the 
basis of a quite different rationale: namely, “preserv[ation of] the 
‘status quo,’ pending the resolution of a socially contentious debate 
taking place in the states over whether to sanction same-sex 
marriage.”52 As it turned out, the district court found neither set of 
justifications persuasive, and therefore concluded that the restriction 
of marriage lacked any “rational relationship” to “a legitimate 
governmental objective.”53 But suppose a court were to conclude that 
one of the congressional rationales would justify DOMA’s restriction 
of marriage to opposite-sex couples. Should it consider itself 
estopped from relying on that justification because of the 
government’s explicit disclaimer? 
An even more complicated version of the issue arises in the 
context of Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the federal constitutional 
challenge to a California constitutional provision restricting marriage 
to opposite-sex couples. In that case, the state attorney general—the 
government official normally charged with representing the state’s 
interests54—essentially disclaimed any state interest in restricting 
                                                                                                                 
 49. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67874 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 50. See id. at *34 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 12–18 (1996)). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at *42. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12511, 12512 (West) (providing that “[t]he Attorney General has 
charge, as attorney, of all legal matters in which the State is interested” and shall “defend all causes to 
which the State, or any State officer is a party in his or her official capacity”). 
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marriage to opposite-sex couples.55 His disclaimer came on the heels 
of a California Supreme Court decision that, while it upheld 
California’s marriage restriction, declined to find any affirmative 
rationale for the restriction.56 Indeed, the California Supreme Court 
went out of its way to adopt the narrowest possible reading of 
Proposition 8, a restriction that left intact the same-sex marriages that 
had occurred,57 as well as the court’s prior holdings that gay couples 
are entitled to state recognition of, and protection for, their 
relationships58 and that all other discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation required strict scrutiny as a matter of state constitutional 
law.59 
Suppose, for a moment, that California’s restriction of marriage 
had been the product of ordinary legislation. If the state’s legal 
representatives were to disclaim reliance on a particular rationale—
say, for example, the welfare-of-the-child justification—would a 
court nonetheless be free to uphold the law on that basis? Does the 
United States Supreme Court’s insistence that courts need not find 
that a legislature actually relied on a particular reason mean that even 
if a court were to conclude that a legislature rejected a reason that 
reason would still justify the law? Or is upholding a law on a basis a 
state expressly disclaims disrespectful of state autonomy? 
In Diamond v. Charles,60 in the course of explaining why a private 
citizen lacked standing to defend a law’s constitutionality once the 
state had conceded its invalidity, the Court explained that “concerns 
for state autonomy” apply with particular force “to an attempt by a 
private individual to compel a State to create and retain [a] legal 
framework.”61 Because only the state “is entitled to create a legal 
code,” the Court concluded that “only the State has the kind of ‘direct 
stake” identified in [the Court’s earlier standing cases] in defending 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78817 at *14. 
 56. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 57. See id. at 122. 
 58. Id. at 76. 
 59. Id. at 78. 
 60. 476 U.S. 54 (1986). 
 61. Id. at 65. 
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the standards embodied in that code.”62 State constitutional and 
statutory provisions that vest power in the state attorney general to 
direct the course of the state’s litigation would seem to empower the 
attorney general to disclaim reliance on a particular argument, and it 
would thus undermine, rather than respect, a state for a federal court 
to foist a rationale on a resisting state. It would resemble a kind of 
Faretta violation.63 As Justice Scalia recently observed in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission,64 the First Amendment’s 
protection of freedom of speech “is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not 
speakers.”65 It would resemble a form of compelled speech to 
associate a government with a justification that its representatives 
deem repugnant.66 
CONCLUSION 
In Shakespeare’s aptly titled Twelfth Night, or What You Will, Sir 
Toby Belch demands of the foppish Sir Andrew Aguecheek, “thy 
exquisite reason, dear knight?,” to which Sir Andrew replied, “I have 
no exquisite reason for’t, but I have reason good enough.”67 The 
question in rationality review cases of when the reason is good 
enough for government work is a fascinating one, particularly when 
the reasons a court provides tell us as much about the court as they do 
about the law at issue. When that issue is combined with the question 
of who can invoke potential reasons for upholding a law, it reveals 
important features of the democratic process as well as the judicial 
one. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975) (explaining that a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights are violated when he is denied the right to represent himself because “[a]n unwanted 
counsel ‘represents’ the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction”). 
 64. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 65. Id. at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 66. Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that New Hampshire could not force 
motorists to display license plates with the phrase “Live Free or Die” on them). 
 67. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFTH NIGHT, Act II, sc. 3 (1601–02). 
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